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1. The Aristotelisms of Unity 
 
It is well-known why Aristotelism was abandoned and why, still today, it continues 
condemned to marginalization. Modernity was constructed against Aristotelism. 
This does not mean that modernity was constructed on the ruins of Aristotelism -in 
fact the Aristotelism of the 16th century1 represents perhaps the most brilliant mo-
ment of its history- but it means that the modern proposal raised like a more credible 
alternative and a more rigorous one regarding Aristotelian scholasticism.  
 
Aristotelism became then synonymous of pre-modern or anti-modern. And this per-
ception continues being true today. The guilty verdict of modernity against Aristotle 
has been more forceful in the West than the anathemas thrown by the bishops of the 
13th century. Algazel (Marmura: 1997) or Ibn Taymiyya (Hallaq: 1993) were able 
to expel Aristotle from Islamic thought, but, in Western culture, the criticisms com-
ing from Hobbes, Descartes, Bacon or Galileo were even more effective in disman-
tling Aristotelism. 
 
Nevertheless, the condemnations of Aristotle, as well as their exaltation by fervent 
Aristotelians, have not always been based on texts from Aristotle, but rather on later 
Aristotelisms. In following, I will pay special attention to one aspect of these mis-
understandings.      
 
Specifically, there is a central doctrine in Aristotle that usually isn’t recognized in 
its importance, and that even sometimes happens to be ignored. I am talking about 
the affirmation of the difference and the plurality. Without a doubt, it is a question 
of emphasis, since it is impossible to speak about Aristotelian philosophy without 
recognizing the relevance that differences have in Aristotelian writings.      
 
However, if the texts of Aristotle are read at the light of later Aristotelisms, it is 
immediately understood why this affirmation of the plurality and the differences has 
been relegated to the backseat. This is because, in religious cultures, ‘Aristotelisms’ 
have been developed having in mind a very marked sense of a single entity. A firm 
faith in a single God is shared by Judaism, Christianity2 and Islam. And even in 
Roman paganism, the Neo-Platonic speculations culminate in a full affirmation of 
the One. 
 
And, as a result, the Roman, Medieval and Renaissance horizons are defined by 
Unity. And more specifically, by the singleness of God. In the end, from Ancient 
                                               
1 “L’influenza di Aristotele non declinò durante il Rinascimento, ma di fatto si accrebbe in maniera enor-
me” (Ch.B. Schmitt: 1985, La tradizione aristotélica: fra Italia e Inghilterra, Bibliopolis, Napoli, p.12) 
2 About some attempts to think philosophically the Trinity from Christian monotheism and platonism, Cf. 
W. Beierwaltes: 1980, Identität und Differenz, Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., in particular concerning 
Marius Victorinus, John Scotus Erigena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa and Hegel 
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Rome to Renaissance Florence everything is reduced to a first single being from 
which all plurality comes. The concept of ‘creation of the world’ will be the manner 
in which diverse theologies –the first one, the Judaism3- will conceive this subordi-
nation of plurality to unity.       
 
Unity will appear in all cases not only as the most essential characteristic of the 
physical universe but also -and specially- as a requirement of thinking. All speech 
has to aspire to coherence and unity. One way or the other, philosophy is expected 
to carry out a task of unification and synthesis, from the multiplicity of phenomena 
to the unity of principles. And even up to the point of arriving at an only and single 
principle. Perhaps this Neo-Platonic imperative continues reappearing today as an 
irrefutable requirement of thinking. For that reason, Aristotle has never look suffi-
cient. An insufficiency that had to be refuted or, in the best case scenario, had to be 
completed.       
 
However, throughout the Roman centuries, we find a common doctrine shared both 
by Platonic and Aristotelian thinkers, in which their respective discrepancies are 
blurred (Hegel: 1997, 12). The limits are so smudge that some platonic and hermetic 
writings got to be attributed to Aristotle, fundamentally from Plotinus and Proclus. 
It is the case of the Liber de Causis (Ancona: 1995) or of the Theology of Aristotle, 
which masked the Aristotelian rejection of platonic unity. This way, in the course of 
the centuries, Aristotelism lost which was perhaps its most characteristic and spe-
cific feature versus Platonism, that is, its criticism of unity and its defense of plural-
ity. 
 
The medieval doctrine of the transcendentals - that is usually attributed to Philip the 
Chancellor (Libera: 1993, 379-382) at the beginning of 13th century- blessed the 
equivalence of one with being, of truth with goodness. The horizon of thinking, 
knowing, and being is governed by oneness. Plurality and difference are subordi-
nated to the first oneness of thinking and being. As a matter of fact, no doctrine can 
be considered more opposed to Aristotelism than this one. 
 
Among Renaissance thinkers we find a variety of Aristotelisms. Next to the Triden-
tine Thomism of the Counter-Reformation, there were other scholastic Aristotelisms 
–such as Averroism, Albertism, Ockhamism, or Scotism-. The discrepancies among 
them were deep sometimes, despite their common profession of Aristotelism. And, 
of course, Aristotelian faith was present both in the Counter-Reformation as in the 
Reformation (Schmitt: 1985, 19-22, 75).      
 
At any rate, next to Renaissance Aristotelism, we find the best known and most 
popular Antiaristotelism of the humanists (Kristeller: 1993; E. Garin: 2001; Grana-
da: 2000). In fact, more than a criticism against the historical Aristotle, it was actu-
ally an acid rejection of scholasticism. At the time, the criticism was the one that has 
always been made to scholasticisms, and that it is still made today: that, whilst scho-
lastics become entangled in the bitterest debates, they just achieved disorienting the 
ordinary man in its action. What Erasmus or More detest from scholastic academics 
                                               
3 A full exposition of Philo’s thought (and in particular about the determining influence of the Jewish 
thought in the neoplatonism) can be found in H.A. Wolfson: 1948, Philo.Foundations of Religious Philo-
sophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. More recently, cf. 
R. Radice: 1989, Platonismo e creazionismo in Filone di Alessandria, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 
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is their conceptual pedantry, which moves away from everyday life. While they im-
merse themselves in their abstractions, all concrete and daily life passes by them 
without them even realizing.  
 
Nevertheless, it is well known the Aristotelian interest on individuality and distinct-
iveness, which does not match the criticisms coming from humanist thinkers. And 
not only in their writings on biology, but mainly in their writings on ethics, rhetoric, 
poetics, or politics. Maybe, quite to the contrary, what we find here is a dispersion 
of particular indications, ordered with unequal success. In fact, Renaissance writers 
were aware of this Aristotelian interest in the individual action, and a clear proof is 
the attention they paid to these practical philosophical writings, to the detriment of 
other works, such as the Analytics.       
 
However, Renaissance Christianity was reading the practical philosophy of Aristotle 
from Stoic and Augustinian concepts that had been systematized by Latin scholastic. 
Concepts like eternal law, natural law, or moral conscience were too rooted in the 
intellectual horizon of the time as to rendering it impossible reading the 
Nichomachean Ethics out of them (see e.g. Aquinas: 1950). That way, common 
moral doctrine placed God as the Supreme Legislator of the physical universe, of 
human society, and of each individual person, in such a way that the unity of the 
creation was guaranteed. 
 
Renaissance culture is basically a Christian culture and, therefore, monotheist and 
convinced of the unity of all reality. Even more, the Humanist allergy to professorial 
theological disputes points toward a firm conviction in the unity of all religions and 
cultures. Cosmopolitism and pacifism are usual in these years. Indeed, Cusa or Pico 
look for finding a way to save the contradictions within such unity. As it happens in 
Leibniz two centuries later, unity of nations and religions is included in the unifying 
ideal of many Renaissance thinkers. And Christianity is portrayed just as the com-
plete synthesis of all particular truths of each and every religion and culture (Gra-
nada: 2000, 83-118). The Renaissance is a culture of unity. 
 
So, in the middle of the 17th century, when Aristotelism fades away from the phi-
losophical scene and is relegated to marginalization, Aristotle’s strong expressions 
against unity have merit little attention. 
 
 
2. The Aristotelism of Difference4      
 
Nevertheless, if we pay close attention to the texts of Aristotle, we find a profound 
rejection of the unification of all reality in a first Unity5. There is not an only Unity 
or Good from which all things come, neither a first Substance, nor a first Subject, 
nor a Being who summarizes and integrates within himself all beings. Neither the 
One (Met., XIV-4, 1091b16-37), nor the Good (EN., I-6, 1096a23-34), not the Be-
ing (1096a23-28) have any reality beyond the fact of being mere abstract concepts.      
 
                                               
4 Perhaps the most complete classification given by Aristotle on the difference is the exposed in Met. X-3, 
1054b 13 - 1055a 2. See also Met. V-9, 1018a12-19 
5 I have examined some texts of Aristotle concerning the concept of difference in J. de Garay: 2001, La 
diferencia en Aristóteles. Anales de la Real Academia de Doctores 5, 251-260. 
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The Aristotelian universe is a plural and differentiated universe, although ordered. 
And of course, the criticism of Aristotle to Unity doesn’t go only against the One of 
platonic philosophy, but it could also be argued against the monotheist God, the ma-
terialistic Matter, or the free and self-creator Subject. As far as Aristotle is con-
cerned, there isn’t One or Being with capital letter, but a plurality of substances, and 
a diversity of senses of being and of unity. Neither there is a first Good in which all 
other goods participate.     
 
Possibly the topos of Aristotelism where the clearest expression of this upholding of 
the difference can be found is the doctrine of the eternity of the world. If differences 
have been there since always, if plurality isn’t something derived but that is first, 
then the world has not been created but is eternal. The Aristotelian rejection of the 
demiurge of the Timeo was nothing more than one of the consequences of its refusal 
to assume the platonic metaphysics of the One and the Dyad. Nevertheless, medie-
val Aristotelism transformed the discussion on the eternity of the world into a debate 
between faith and reason, where both Averroists and Anti-Averroists argued.    
 
The Gamma book of Metaphysics is the place where the irreducibility of the differ-
ences to the unity is more explicitly proclaimed (Met., IV-4,1007b18-22) 6. The af-
firmation of the difference of substances is as primary as the principle of non con-
tradiction (Met., IV-4,1008a20-27). The first principle is not the One but the plural-
ity. The horizon of thinking is not the unity but the diversity of the logos. The unity 
of the logos presupposes the differences within reality.       
 
Without a doubt Aristotle is not a postmodernist avant la lettre. Alongside the af-
firmation of the differences there is always the unity of the logos and other mean-
ings of the unity. But, at any rate, what Aristotle clearly is not is a Neo-Platonic. His 
philosophy is the antithesis of the One from Plotinus or Proclus. 
 
Consequently, for him all causes are not reduced to one. And in general, not every-
thing has a cause.  Everything does not have a logical and necessary reason which 
explains why something has happened in one way and not otherwise. Reality cannot 
be reduced to reason, because then it would be necessary to arrive to one and only 
first reason, in which all reasons and all beings would be transformed. Neither every 
thing real is rational, because then there would be one and only first principle of all, 
and that is impossible. The farthest reason is capable of arriving is ordering all dif-
ferences in a cosmos. But that unity of order is never a constituent of the differ-
ences.      
 
This irreducibility of plurality versus unity is another naturalistic version of the 
eternal return vindicated by Nietzsche. Difference is irreductible to unity. The divine 
One is displaced to an indefatigable and cyclical Nature that never stops working in 
a differentiating manner.        
 
On the other hand, concerning mathematics, there is not an absolute disqualification. 
His criticism aims at the idea that everything real can be measured by unity7. If all 
number comes from unity, and if everything is number, then everything comes from 
the One. That’s why he insists on limiting the role of mathematics to a function of 
                                               
6 A systematic critique of the One can be found in Phys., I-2, 185a20--187a11 
7 Cf. Met. XIV-1, 1087b33 
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measurement. To measure is always to measure something, and that something pre-
cedes measurement. Therefore, everything isn’t measured, everything isn’t number. 
The reality of measured things is diverse of the same measurement. Number makes 
possible the equivalence between all things. The equal sign allows uniting the most 
heterogeneous, by means of the expression of its relations. But what Aristotle em-
phasizes is indeed that there are differences behind such equality, not that equality is 
false or that mathematics might be useless. But, furthermore, he emphasizes that 
there are differences which precede measurement, and they are neither measurable, 
nor equalizable, nor matematizable. 
 
The affirmation of differences is also visible in its well-known formulation of the 
diversity of the senses of being. It is not necessary to look for the sense of being be-
cause there is not a single signification of being. The inquiry for the sense of being 
lacks an answer. Instead there is a plurality of meanings of being. The diverse as-
pects of reality cannot be reduced to a unique one. Accident, falseness, or possibility 
are as real and relevant as substance, necessity, truth, or act.       
 
In particular, potentiality is a sense of being that is never reduced to an act (Met., 
IX-3, 1046b29-1047a24). Not only it exists what now is, but it also exists what can 
be, but still it is not (and perhaps never will be). Even more, all the Aristotelian 
analysis of human action, freedom and practical reason demands the reality of po-
tentiality (EN., VI-4, 1139b37-1140a 2).  
 
On the other hand, the accident (to symbebekos) shows that what is meaningful is 
not only the  identity of the substance, but also the diversity of qualities and move-
ments, places and times, amounts and possessions. The meaning of the accidents is 
not the sense of the substance, but in spite of that they are not nonsense.      
 
In a similar way, the accidental - the being kata symbebekos - has also meaning, in-
sofar as it makes possible human action (EN., I-3,1094b11-27). The indetermination 
of the physical universe makes it possible for man to act in a no predetermined way. 
As Epicurus learned well from Aristotle, a certain deviation of necessity (the clina-
men of Lucretius) is required in order to make human freedom possible. Without the 
indetermination of accidentality there would be neither contingency nor freedom.       
 
 
3. Dialectics, Rhetoric and Practical Philosophy      
 
Aristotle has been usually considered - and rightly - as a symbol of science. Conse-
quently later Aristotelisms have read Aristotelian texts under the prism of science. 
Scientific demonstration was deemed the paradigm of knowledge. Therefore all 
knowing or thinking which would not adjust to scientific reasoning was seen as pre-
liminary to science. Although Aristotle might have been abandoned, this faith in 
science as a paradigm of knowledge has not disappeared, at least in the so called 
Western world.      
 
Nevertheless, Aristotle had analyzed other forms of knowledge out of science. It 
was the case of dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, politics, etc.8 We are referring to 
                                               
8 Alfarabi: 1953 (Catálogo de las ciencias, CSIC, Madrid) carried out  a systematization of the Aristote-
lian forms of knowledge, that decisively influenced Islamic philosophy (cf. D.L. Black: 1990, Logic and 
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knowledges that pay attention to what is contingent and, therefore, are art rather 
than science. Their scope is different from nature, which can be characterized by oc-
curring always or most of the times.       
 
When confronted with different realities, knowledge also has to be different. For 
that reason, human action requires different types of knowledge. Perhaps, in the past 
century, it has been Heidegger the first one -in the Natorp Report-  who has at-
tracted attention to the peculiarity of the practical philosophy of Aristotle (Heideg-
ger: 2002). And Gadamer has known to develop those suggestions throughout all his 
work9. 
 
Theoría does not encompass the Aristotelian exposition in its entirety. Next to the 
robust identity of scientific truths, nothing is so differentiated as human action, as it 
is always performed from a new starting point. Each singular action comes from dif-
ferentiated habits that constitute like a second nature - different for each individual -. 
If actions are conformed by habits, and if habits are continuously transformed 
through each action, no action is exactly identical to another one (EN., VI-8, 
1141b32-1142a1; 1142a25-28). Opposed to nature, which is an identical principle of 
movement and rest, the source of human action is in reason, which is a potency of 
opposites (Met., IX-2, 1046a36-b24).       
 
Human action takes place in an environment differentiated by circumstances, that is 
to say, by accidents and the accidental. In human action accidents such as place, po-
sition, time, habit, quality, amount, passion, etc. are all relevant. And they are also 
relevant -and by far- coincidences and chances, as well as sporadic and unusual oc-
currences. That something happens a single time due to an accumulation of coinci-
dences can be essential to make a decision that otherwise would never had been 
taken.      
 
In summary, if we are trying to think the difference, then it is necessary to think ac-
tion. In other words, if we observe reality sub specie identitatis, meaning from the 
perspective of identity, then the most appropriate place to look for identities is the 
physical universe, where regularities and necessities abound. But if we observe real-
ity sub specie differentiae, then human and social reality comes up to the fore-
ground. They are two different forms of wisdom and rationality: the world can be 
seen focusing on identities or on differences. They are two different aspects of real-
ity. The same reality but considered from two different points of view. As the Me-
dieval Latins say, the obiectum formale is different.       
 
But identity is not the only aspect to which we pay attention. That is precisely the 
huge prejudice that, since Plato, ballasts our conception of knowledge. In fact, we 
pay attention to many other aspects of what is real, and very particularly to singular-
ity, to what is unique, accidental, and circumstantial. Moment and fitting place are 
two aspects of reality that have the utmost interest for human beings. Estimating the 
                                                                                                                                         
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Brill, Leiden), on Jewish thougth (spe-
cially through Maimonides), and also on the Latin philosophy, mainly through the version of Dominicus 
Gundissalinus (M. Alonso ed.: 1954, De scientiis, CSIC, Madrid). 
9 I have studied the Gadamer’s Aristotelism in J. de Garay: 2005, Hermenéutica y formas aristotélicas de 
racionalidad. In T. Oñate (ed.): Hans-Georg Gadamer: Ontología estética y hermenéutica, Dykinson, 
Madrid, pp. 329-354 
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right circumstance is essential. Science does pay attention to identity, or at least to 
what gets close to identity, such as statistical regularities. For that reason, today we 
have learned to turn into science the old arts of medicine, psychology, sociology, 
economy or politics. But seeing or listening to somebody from the perspective of 
identity has little to do with seeing him or listening to him from the perspective of 
the difference.      
 
Thinking the action is thinking what is singular (EN., III-1, 1110b6-7; VI-7, 
1141b15-16). The Aristotelian concern for the individual does not finish with “Soc-
rates” or “Callias”, or with the empirical facts that nourish scientific argumentation. 
The individual being for Aristotle is, above all, the human action. Accordingly prac-
tical rationality can never be universal science (EN., I-6, 29-32), insofar as it lacks 
the minimal identity required for science. 
 
If other forms of knowledge are examined in light of practical rationality, then it can 
be perceived how, not only ethics or politics, but also rhetoric or dialectics consti-
tute forms of rationality that are different from science. Indeed in dialectic and rhe-
torical speech action plays a central role. Of course, for Aristotle science is also ac-
tion, because all intellection is action: energeia, praxis (Met., IX-6, 1048b22-36). 
But in the scientific speech, the particularity of the human action is erased to open 
the way to impersonal scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, dialectic and rhetorical 
speeches are always circumscribed to the individual.      
 
Dialectic speech is always a speech of many voices: that is to say, a discourse spo-
ken and thought from different perspectives. The interlocutors are particular indi-
viduals who express themselves from a particular horizon, and who ask and respond 
according to their historical and cultural circumstances. In dialectics they are con-
fronted simultaneously different senses of the same. 
 
Aristotelian dialectics represent the other face of the principle of non contradiction. 
If in this principle the unity of coherence is required, the unity of each meaning that 
makes possible the unity of speech (Met., IX-6, 1048b22-36), dialectics instead is 
always open to diverse interlocutors, speeches, and meanings (Soph.Ref., 19). The 
unity of scientific speech is preceded by the diversity of dialectic speeches. For that 
same reason, Aristotle considers a central function of dialectics the preparation for 
science (Top., I, 101a25-b4). In the dialectic speech we do not find a unity of mean-
ing but a diversity of significations. The great value of dialectics is to be able to 
think simultaneously different senses of the same. Furthermore, the meaning of the 
speech of any interlocutor keeps changing as the dialogue advances, because it is 
transformed by the questions and answers already expressed. Meaning is always 
something changeable, and nevertheless it is possible to think with this continuous 
variation of meanings. The Faktum of the dialogue proves that the mind can think 
the plurality and the diversity of particular senses.      
 
The different consideration of Aristotle’s dialectic versus Plato is another manifesta-
tion of the Aristotelian allergy towards the unity. Rejection, criticism, dialogue, and 
discussion do not culminate necessarily in the unity of the conflicting positions. 
Agreement is not the forced result of dialogue. Differences in approaches, discrep-
ancy, and confrontation go hand in hand both at the beginning and also at the end of 
any dialogue. The unity is in the logos, in the language, in the speech, but not in the 
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conclusion. The interlocutors, the meaning, and the contradictions can vary but they 
never disappear completely. Even more, it is their diversity the one that constitutes 
the unity of the logos. Without such plurality the very logos would disappear. The 
unity of the speech is not the unity of the truth. Dialectics do not develop looking for 
more advanced explanations every time, until finding the reason of all reasons that 
is beyond all questioning  and all reason. 
 
In rhetoric -a part of dialectics according to Aristotle (Ret., I-2, 1356a31; I-1, 
1354a1-6)- contradictory speeches also abound, as well as the most diverse inten-
tions and senses. Audiences and speakers change constantly, also according to cir-
cumstances. The rhetorical discourse is a changing discourse and always a diverse 
one. If in the dialectic debate the meaning of the discourse - and the meanings of the 
discourses of each interlocutor - keep changing according to the gist of the commu-
nication, the same thing happens in the case of rhetorical speech, where listeners or 
readers keep modifying their attitude and attention as the speech progresses. The 
particular circumstances in which the rhetorical speech takes place – for example 
emotions- not only do not have to be surpassed (as in science) but they actually be-
long to the same argumentation.      
 
Certainly, if the dialectic speech is marked by differences, even more so is rhetorical 
speech. If in dialectic speech the search for the truth is present in some way (Top.I-
1) in the horizon of the interlocutors (even if only with the goal of winning in the 
discussion using stronger arguments), conversely in rhetorical speech reference to 
the truth is not required at all. Diversity of meanings does not get articulated around 
the search for the truth, but independently from it. That is why the purpose of rhe-
torical speech can also be mockery, contempt, or laughter. Persuasion is not aimed 
towards the truth but towards action, and therefore even a lie might be its goal.      
 
Rhetoric is directly linked to action. It is a practical reasoning that seeks concluding 
with the actions of the listeners. Persuasion is only a necessary way for action. Thus 
the central role that emotions play in Aristotelian rhetoric, since they are the ones 
that more easily can move to action.       
 
The XIX and XX centuries have witnessed a certain recovery of Aristotle in differ-
ent scopes (Volpi: 1999). Contemporary hermeneutics have taken a step ahead, 
mainly thanks to Gadamer, who has insisted on the continuity of hermeneutics with 
practical Aristotelian philosophy (Gadamer: 1977 y 1992). This way, Nichomachean 
Ethics or the Rhetoric have regained an interest that, only half a century ago, would 
have been unthinkable. The context is now the pragmatic dimension of language. 
Surprisingly, dialectics rhetoric, and in general the Aristotelian treatment of speech 
and discourse have progressed to occupy a relevant place in the philosophical debate 
of the last decades. Similar accounts have been set off from Perelman’s New Rheto-
ric (Perelman: 1952 y 2000) or Viehweg’s legal logic (Viehweg: 1986). In all those 
cases we find a recovery of one of Aristotle’s central concerns: thinking the differ-
ences and thinking the action. 
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